Introduction
There are two main categories of risk associated with growing crops: uncertainty associated with the amount or quality of output generated (yield or production risk) and uncertainty about the price received for output (price risk). This paper is concerned with the production risks associated with dryland broadacre cropping, which relies on rainfall for production.
Crop production may be adversely affected by weather conditions -drought, flooding, hail, heavy winds and frost -and by fire, plant disease and pests. The largest cause of uncertainty is variation in rainfall, which is highly variable in Australia. Separate from discrete seasonal variation in rainfall are droughts, which may be defined in an agricultural context as 'a protracted period of deficient precipitation resulting in extensive damage to crops, resulting in loss of yield ' (Lindesay 2003, p. 31) .
Data from a survey of Western Australian farmers is used to consider two issues in farm risk management. First, the farmers' willingness to pay for insurance that protects against wheat yield variability is modelled as a function of risk aversion, risk of crop failure and government assistance. Second, production data is used to test whether farmers are able to make use of seasonal weather forecasts to tailor their planting strategy and thus manage the risk of crop failure caused by low rainfall. The empirical findings shed light on the prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the market for crop insurance. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to agricultural risk management in Australia. Section 3 sets out the theory of risk aversion, adverse selection and moral hazard, which explains the structure of the market for crop insurance in Western Australia. Section 4 outlines details of the farm survey that was conducted and Section 5 contains the empirical models and estimation results.
Agricultural Risk Management in Western Australia
Market based tools for the transfer of production risks are limited in Australian agriculture.
Broadacre crops may be insured against hail and fire damage but not against losses of crop yield caused by lack of rain (drought), flood or frost. Most insurance policies combine coverage for losses caused by hail and fire and a number of other perils including damage caused by lightning or spontaneous combustion, explosion, chemical overspray from neighbouring properties and straying livestock. There is no multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI) available that would also cover damages caused by drought, flood and frost. In fact, these risks to crops are uninsurable in Australia. The empirical analysis in this paper is based on the available hail insurance broadly defined to cover hail and all other perils included in a crop hail policy.
Premiums for broadacre hail insurance are based upon the location of the farm and the type of crop being covered. Location ratings relate to weather patterns and are calculated on a shire or postcode basis -shires that have greater prevalence of hail attract higher premiums. Similarly, insurers charge more for crops that are more prone to hail damage. In Australia farm yield history is not taken into account when premiums are set. Premiums generally range from 0.5%-2.5% of the insured crop value with the majority of premiums being under 1% (Multi Peril Crop Insurance Task Force 2003, p. 21) .
In Australia agricultural insurance is provided by three private insurers that underwrite crop and livestock policies, nine that offer crop insurance only and three that offer livestock policies only (Mahul & Stutley 2010, p. 11) . Yearly premium totals for agricultural insurance are volatile and influenced by seasonal weather, which affects the volume of insured crops, and commodity prices, which affect their value. A World Bank survey estimated that in 2007, 50% of Australian farmers had a crop insurance policy and 50% of the cropped area was insured (Mahul & Stutley 2010, p. 12 
Risk Aversion, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
A crucial determinant of the demand for insurance is risk aversion. A risk averse individual values a risky prospect at less than its expected value and is thus willing to pay for insurance that grants certainty of income. Risk aversion is a property of the utility function that can be measured by calculating the income elasticity of marginal utility:
The measure R, which is also known as the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is calculated at a specific level of income Y and, as elasticity, is dimensionless. A positive value of R indicates risk aversion; the higher the value, the more concave the utility function and the stronger the risk aversion. A value of R = 0 indicates that the utility function is linear and the individual is risk neutral.
In the context of insurance, the risk premium is the amount of income that an individual is willing to give up in order to be indifferent between the certain level of income given by insurance and the expected income that would be earned without insurance. The risk premium depends positively on risk (the objective component) and risk aversion (the subjective component). Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, p. 73) show that the risk premium can be related to the coefficient of relative risk aversion by carrying out Taylor expansions of U(Y) at the risky income and at the certainty equivalent level of income , which is the mean income Y minus the risk premium . The relative risk premium as a fraction of mean income can be expressed as a function of risk aversion and risk in the following manner:
In the preceding equation, is the standard deviation in income and Y  is the coefficient of
Thus, the relative risk premium is approximately half the squared coefficient of variation multiplied by the coefficient of relative risk aversion R.
Expressing the risk premium this way is useful because it is dimensionless and can be compared across agents with different mean incomes. The relative risk premium increases with the squared coefficient of variation (greater risk) and with the coefficient of relative risk aversion (greater risk aversion). In Section 5 the relative risk premium is estimated using farm survey data in Western Australia.
Insurance markets differ from traditional goods markets because the distinction between demand and supply breaks down. Adverse selection implies that the cost of providing insurance is directly related to the demand for insurance. Holding other factors constant, buyers with a higher probability of loss will expect a greater return from an insurance policy than low risk buyers and, consequently, will have greater willingness to pay for the policy.
Adverse selection arises due to asymmetry of information between buyers and insurance providers. Insurers that do not possess information about differences in buyer risk will offer an average premium rate to a heterogeneous risk pool with high risk buyers tending to purchase greater coverage and low risk buyers being priced out (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) . Adverse selection may cause underinsurance or complete market failure as low risk individuals exit the market. In a crop insurance market, adverse selection can arise if farmers know more about their chance of crop failure and expected yield than insurers, who may have access to regional yield data but may lack farm level data.
Moral hazard is the change in unobservable behaviour induced by the existence of an insurance contract. It occurs because insurance shifts the risk of loss from the insured to the insurer. Zweifel & Breyer (1997, p. 157 ) distinguish between ex-post and ex-ante moral hazard. If the size of the loss increases as a result of the contract, the moral hazard is referred to as ex-post. This may be because the policy holder no longer exerts as much effort into taking measures that reduce the severity of a loss when it occurs. If the probability of a loss is increased due to changed behaviour towards the risk, the moral hazard is referred to as exante as it occurs before the loss.
In this paper it is theorised that farmers can avoid losses by planting less in low-rainfall seasons, such as predicted El Nino years. Surveys by the Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE); the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; and the Bureau of Meteorology found significant knowledge of and use of seasonal weather forecasts in agricultural management decisions (Hayman et al. 2007, p. 977) . If farmers can reliably predict the weather for a plant cycle, a positive correlation between area planted and crop yield in t/ha would be expected. Multi-peril crop insurance shifts the risk of crop failure from the farmer to the insurance company, reducing the incentive to behave prudently. As a consequence, less attention will be paid to weather forecasts and the crop area will remain large in years with poor weather conditions. This gives rise to ex-post moral hazard because crop insurance does not increase the probability of a loss but it raises the size of a loss associated with a bigger crop. Moral hazard promotes inefficient farming and will eventually cause premiums to rise as insurance companies have higher expected costs over the longer time frame.
Survey Outline
The farm survey was conducted with the cooperation of broadacre farmers belonging to Western Australian grower groups. Surveys were distributed via email to 27 grower groups during June-September 2011. As well as this, hard copies of the questionnaire were handed out at committee meetings of the North Kojonup Production Group and the Liebe Group in Dalwallinu. Respondents were given the opportunity to answer using email, surface mail, fax or an online survey hosting website. A total of 19 usable responses from ten different postcodes were obtained. The Appendix shows the grower groups that were approached, the shire locations of the respondents and the questionnaire sent out to farmers. In order to obtain a measure of production variability, farmers were asked to give details of their crop production from 2006-2010 in terms of yield in t/ha and hectares planted.
1 The mean area planted over five years was 15,632 ha, while the median was 10,813 ha. The average yield of all crops produced over the five years (total tonnes produced/total hectares planted) had a mean of 1.50 t/ha, median of 1.44 t/ha and standard deviation of 0.26 t/ha. The minimum was 1.13 t/ha and the maximum 2.03 t/ha. Of the 420,880 t produced by the 19 farms in five years, wheat accounted for 354,522 t; consequently, the following analysis will focus on total crop and wheat production.
Wheat production in terms of both hectares planted and tonnes per hectare varied strongly over the five years. 2008 and 2009 were high-producing years with 118,649 t and 103,472 t respectively, while 2006 and 2007 had less than 42,000 t. In general, there were more hectares planted in the higher yielding years, which suggests that farmers took advantage of seasonal weather forecasts. The standard deviation in the total wheat yield of all farms combined over the five years was 0.56 t/ha. In comparison, the mean standard deviation of wheat yield on individual farms over the five years was 0.71 t/ha. Controlling for geographical location, the mean standard deviation of wheat yield between years for the six farms located in Dalwallinu was 0.68 t/ha. The fact that there is greater variability in yield within farms than across farms means that an insurance company setting premiums based on shire yield data for a product that insures against yield loss will set them too low. Farmers who have more variable yields have a greater probability of their yield falling below the insured level and should be charged higher premiums. Charging a premium based on shire level variability will underestimate the probability of loss.
The most noticeable feature from farmers' responses regarding their hail insurance is that although premiums vary, almost all farmers take out full coverage. In terms of percentage of expected crop value, the mean coverage chosen was 87% with 14 out of 19 farmers choosing to cover their entire crop. Three farmers chose between 80% and 95% coverage and two had no insurance policy. The lowest premium paid was 0.49% of the insured crop value while the highest was 2%. The mean premium was 0.75% with a standard deviation of 0.43%.
Removing the two farms that did not buy insurance, the mean premium charged was 0.84%.
The variation in premiums is to be expected due to the variation in farm locations and types of crop planted, as hail premiums are primarily based on these two factors. The high take up of insurance suggests that adverse selection does not impair the market for hail insurance. There is no asymmetric information because it is unlikely that a farmer has a better predictive ability over the risk of hail damage than an insurance company that has access to the same meteorological information as the farmer.
Empirical Results
In this section farmers' willingness to pay for insurance that protects against wheat yield variability is modelled. Hail insurance has the effect of guaranteeing a certain yield in t/ha for the farmer's crop in the event of damage. This is similar to drought insurance or multi-peril crop insurance, which are not available in Australia. The model estimates the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the impact that the Federal Government's ECIRS program has on willingness to pay for hail insurance.
The empirical model is based on equation 2 with an extra term being added that captures the effect of government assistance in the event of crop failure. . The risk premium is the amount of income that, when given in exchange for insurance, will equalise utility in the loss and non-loss states. Farmers actually pay an 'unfair' premium that includes an extra loading factor that is determined by the insurance company's administration costs and profit. The intercept term  0 may be interpreted as the loading factor that farmers pay to the insurance company independent of risk. ECIRS is a dummy variable that is set equal to 1 if the farm has ever received emergency aid in the form of an Exceptional Circumstances Interest Rate Subsidy. This variable is used to test whether access to government support reduces the willingness to pay for insurance. u is the error term.
Equation 5 was estimated using OLS, corrected for heteroscedasticity. The full regression output is included in the technical Appendix.
The regression results indicate that the farmers' willingness to pay for hail insurance strongly depends on the variability of crop yield. The estimated value of  1 is -0.22 with a standard error of 0.12. The negative value implies that receiving ECIRS payments from the government reduces willingness to pay for insurance. This finding is consistent with the view of the Productivity Commission (2009) that ECIRS payments create a perverse incentive for producers to be less self-reliant and manage the risk of drought less effectively in the knowledge that they will receive government support. The ECIRS program is effectively a substitute for holding drought insurance and as a result reduces willingness to pay for insurance. The policy is one of the contributing factors for the failure of a private drought insurance market to develop in Australia. Removing the ECIRS variable from the model yields an R of 2.1.
3
The positive value of R indicates that farmers are risk averse. With risk aversion, the willingness to pay for yield insurance depends positively on the variation in crop yield; that is, higher risk farmers are willing to pay more for insurance. This may give rise to adverse selection in markets for insurance that protect against losses in yield caused by hail or other events. Farmers who have greater variation in their wheat yield are more likely to suffer crop failures and are more likely to claim. They are associated with higher expected costs to cover and should be charged higher premiums. In Western Australia insurance companies collect average yield data for entire shires. Nevertheless, adverse selection does not appear to be a major problem in the market for hail insurance because the estimated equation 5 indicates that insurance companies are able to charge premiums that reflect the objective risk of the insured farmers.
The potential for moral hazard can be gauged by considering the effort of farmers to avoid crop losses. One risk management strategy involves the use of seasonal weather forecasts to determine the optimal crop area to be planted. Insurance may give rise to ex-post moral hazard because it reduces the incentive to pay attention to seasonal weather forecasts, increasing the size of the loss should adverse weather conditions arise during the planting cycle. A positive correlation between hectares planted and crop yield in t/ha indicates that forward looking farmers take advantage of seasonal weather forecasts.
For the empirical analysis a panel data set was compiled using the five years of production data collected from each farm. A fixed effects panel regression removes time invariant data, allowing assessment of the predictor's net effect (in this case the effect of yield in t/ha on hectares planted). It should be noted that while it is theorised that a farmer's decision to plant is based on the season's predicted or expected yield, the data regressed on is the actual t/ha produced. The fixed effects panel regression model is:
The crop area is measured in hectares and crop yield is tonnes per hectare. u it is the error term.
There is no intercept term as it is wiped out as a time invariant variable. The estimated model for wheat is:
The estimated parameter a is 434.26 with a standard error of 152.13. Thus, it can be concluded that a significant positive relationship exists between the area planted and wheat yield. The regression was also run for the composite value of all crops as well as barley with similar results. These findings show that farmers plant more crops in higher yielding years, suggesting that they are able to predict weather conditions by using meteorological information and to manage the risk appropriately. There exists the potential for moral hazard as the introduction of drought insurance would reduce the incentive to behave prudently.
Conclusion
The findings in this paper shed light on the provision of crop yield insurance in Western Australia. First, there is a demand for insurance as the degree of risk aversion of Western
Australian farmers is similar to that of other asset holders. Second, adverse selection plays a minor role in the market for hail insurance because observed insurance premiums reflect farm specific risks. Third, government emergency assistance reduces the willingness to pay for insurance. Fourth, there arises the potential for moral hazard because with no drought insurance farmers manage the risk of crop failure by using meteorological information. A future supplier of drought insurance must take into consideration that the introduction of drought insurance will change the risk management practices of farmers.
It remains an open question to what degree the findings on hail insurance carry over to multiperil crop insurance that also covers drought and frost. In analysing the stability of risk preferences across five different types of insurance, Einav et al. (2012) found that an individual's choice in one insurance market has substantial predictive power for their choices in other insurance markets. Insurance domains that are 'similar' such as prescription drug insurance and health insurance are particularly good predictors of each other. It is reasonable to assume that the same applies for hail insurance and drought insurance because the loss caused by damage from hail and drought is the same -they both affect farm income by way of damaging crops. However, there is no reason to believe that insurance companies have access to the same information even in similar markets. In particular, it seems that there exists less private information that is hidden from insurance companies in the market for hail insurance than the market for drought insurance. 
Privacy Policy
The information collected will be treated as strictly confidential and will not be used for any other purpose apart from research conducted by the principal investigator Amy Khuu. In your answers do not include any information that would identify you personally or your farm.
Supervisor
Associate Professor E. Juerg Weber, Department of Economics, University of Western Australia, Email: juerg.weber@uwa.edu.au Questions Please answer all questions, partial answers will also be helpful. 
Farm background

Uninsurable Risks
This question deals with potential crop insurance for drought, frost and flood which currently does not exist in Australia or is hard to get. Notes: All figures are for one year, except for claims data which is a record of the past ten years. Highest Premium Willing to Pay: Farmers were asked for maximum amount they would be willing to pay for their existing insurance policy. Unclaimed losses: Losses caused by insurable events like hail and fire that were not claimed due to lack of insurance or other reason. Uninsurable Risk: Farmers were asked for the maximum premium they would be willing to pay for insurance against drought, frost and flood. Loss Ratio = ($ Claims received / ($ yearly premium*10)) * 100 Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif *************************************************************************** Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif *************************************************************************** Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif *************************************************************************** Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif *************************************************************************** Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif *************************************************************************** 
